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Abstract
The massive integration of renewable energy sources in the power grid ecosystem
with the aim of reducing carbon emissions must cope with their intrinsically
intermittent and unpredictable nature. Therefore, the grid must improve its
capability of controlling the energy demand by adapting the power consumption
curve to match the trend of green energy generation. This could be done by
scheduling the activities of deferrable and/or interruptible electrical appliances.
However, communicating the users’ needs about the usage of their appliances
also leaks sensitive information about their habits and lifestyles, thus arising
privacy concerns.
This paper proposes a framework to allow the coordination of energy con-
sumption without compromising the privacy of the users: the service requests
generated by the domestic appliances are divided into crypto-shares using Shamir
Secret Sharing scheme and collected through an anonymous routing protocol by
a set of schedulers, which schedule the requests by directly operating on the
shares. We discuss the security guarantees provided by our proposed infrastruc-
ture and evaluate its performance, comparing it with the optimal scheduling
obtained by means of an Integer Linear Programming formulation.
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1. Introduction
One of the most relevant goals in the design of the future energy grid is
the massive introduction of power plants exploiting Renewable Energy Sources
(RES, e.g. wind, solar and geothermal energy) to reduce carbon emission and
shift towards a more sustainable power usage. However, due to the intrinsic5
unpredictability in the production of “green” power caused by the intermittent
nature of renewables, the new Smart Grid scenario will cope with numerous
issues related to the balancing of energy generation and consumption within
the grid, in order to satisfy the energy demand while avoiding power waste. In
addition, the energy market will experience more uncertain conditions, which10
could possibly affect the dynamics of energy pricing [1].
In order to increase the flexibility of the energy utilization, three comple-
mentary approaches have been proposed. The first is to equip the grid with high
capacity storage banks, capable of storing energy surpluses and to release them
in case of energy production deficits [2]. However, today’s state-of-the-art tech-15
nology is still immature to allow a widespread introduction of storage plants,
which would require tremendous installation and maintenance costs. A second
possibility is to induce some modifications in the user’s energy utilization behav-
ior by designing time-variable tariffs or introducing incentives to shift the use
of some appliances to off-peak hours [3]. Unfortunately, this approach does not20
provide any form of direct control on the load conditions of the grid. Finally,
the third alternative relies on load scheduling approaches operating at single
household level or at neighborhood/microgrid level with the aim of shaping the
energy demand profile in order to meet the production trend. Such mechanisms
work according to the following principle: delay-tolerant and/or interruptible25
operations can be scheduled and initiated only when the green energy produc-
tion conditions are favorable, while in case of power shortage the starting time
can be postponed or the service can be momentarily interrupted. Moreover, a
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wide category of appliances (e.g. refrigerators, air conditioning, cooling/heating
systems) can tune (up to a certain extent) their power consumption according30
to the grid state.
The drawback of the load scheduling approach is that it requires the users
to communicate to the scheduler their preferences about the time of use and
the energy consumption profile of the appliances to be scheduled, which makes
the system prone to appliance load monitoring attacks (e.g. Non Intrusive Load35
Monitoring (NILM), load disaggregation algorithms, and transient analysis). In
fact, it has been widely proved that, by analyzing the power consumption trend
of an individual household, very detailed information about the personal habits
of the occupants can be inferred [4, 5], making it possible even to identify
the specific electrical appliances working in a given time period. Therefore,40
designing a load scheduling system capable of preserving the privacy of the
users is still an open issue.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-friendly infrastructure to perform appli-
ance load scheduling within a neighborhood, which directly exposes neither the
time of use and the energy consumption pattern of the single appliances, nor45
the identity of the users specifying the scheduling requests. Our solution relies
on a set of schedulers which collaboratively perform the load planning by means
of a MultiParty Computation (MPC) protocol based on Shamir Secret Sharing
scheme. The proposed architecture is in line with the recent proposals by regu-
lation bodies: for example, the California Public Utilities Commission [6] fosters50
the realization of Energy Data Centers aimed at the collection and elaboration
of energy consumption data and run by governmental or public entities. While
such Data Centers are assumed to be honest, our proposed architecture ensures
no violation of the customers’ privacy even in presence of collectors behaving
according to the “honest but curious” model.55
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a
short overview of the related literature, while Section 3 recalls some background
notions. Section 4 describes the privacy-preserving scheduling architecture. The
attacker model and the security analysis of our proposed infrastructure are
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discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, the scheduling problem is formulated as an60
Integer Linear Program (ILP), which is used as a benchmark for the complexity
and performance assessment provided in Section 7. Conclusions are drawn in
the final Section.
2. Related Work
Various models for energy load management systems have been recently65
proposed by the research community: in [7], an optimal and automatic resi-
dential energy consumption scheduling framework is described, which attempts
to strike a balance between minimizing the electricity payment and minimiz-
ing the waiting time for the operation of each appliance in the household, in
presence of time-variable tariffs. The problem is modelled by means of a linear70
programming formulation and a weighted average price prediction filter is used
to estimate the future trend of the energy tariff. A real-time residential load
management model and algorithm is also discussed in [8], which differentiates
the scheduling policy according to the type of electrical appliances to be served
(interruptible, non interruptible and must-run). However, in both cases the75
system is designed for a single household, while our scheduling framework is
aimed at controlling multiple residential buildings. The authors of [9] propose a
neighborhood scheduler that divides the energy requests in queues according to
their shape and priority and optimizes the service time of deferrable individual
appliances (e.g. washing machines, dishwashers, cloth dryers, and electric vehi-80
cles recharge). In case the electrical appliances are assumed to have rectangular
energy consumption profile, the scheduling problem can be treated as a rectan-
gle/strip packing problem, which has been thoroughly investigated, for example
in [10, 11, 12], and consists in optimally placing a set of rectangles of different
dimensions in a two-dimensional space of given width and infinite height.85
In our framework, differently from [7], the optimization goal is to shape the
cumulative energy consumption of a set of appliances according to the avail-
ability of energy generated by renewable energy sources. We deal with the
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same scenario and appliance category of [9], but with respect to [9] we also con-
sider must-run and interruptible appliances. Conversely, [12] proposes an online90
power strip packing algorithm for malleable energy demands with rectangular
shape, providing performance guarantees in terms of upper bounds with respect
to the optimal solution. Apart from the different appliance category, though our
solution does not provide any guarantee on the quality of service experienced by
the users, it deals with appliances having a generic energy consumption curve.95
Though the problem of securely managing the energy consumption data has
been widely studied in the context of the Automatic Metering Infrastructure
(AMI) of Smart Grid, to the best of our knowledge this is the one of the first
studies specifically dealing with data security in a load scheduling framework.
Moreover, the security assumptions modeling the adversarial entities which at-100
tempt to access users’ data are quite various and most often too loose with
respect to realistic attack scenarios. Paper [13] proposes a distributed archi-
tecture in which multiple Home Energy Management (HEM) units collaborate
with each other in order to keep the demand and supply balanced in their
neighbourhood by solving a multi-stage stochastic optimization problem. The105
proposed system hides the users’ individual information to any external entity
(e.g., energy provider or grid manager) but requires the customers to commu-
nicate their power schedules to their neighbours. Conversely, paper [14] avoids
data exchange among households, but assumes a trusted energy utility to col-
lect the individual power consumption curves and to broadcast price information110
which are updated at every game iteration. Our solution does not require any
end-to-end communication among the households: neighboring meters acts ex-
clusively as relays running the Crowds protocol to transmit messages which
are ciphered by means of an hybrid encryption algorithm. Furthermore, our
framework assumes a pool of possibly colluding honest-but-curious schedulers,115
ensuring that no information leaks occurs in case at least one scheduler is not
colluded. Papers [15, 16] assume that exchanging aggregated power consump-
tion data at household level (e.g., on hourly basis) is sufficient to hide the usage
patterns of single electric appliances to untrustworthy neighbours. However,
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several studies on Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (see, e.g., [17, 18]) prove that120
the power consumption patterns of individual appliances can easily be inferred
from house-aggregated measurements. To defy such kind of attacks, our pro-
posed protocol hides the energy consumption patterns of individual appliances
to both schedulers and neighboring meters by means of Shamir Secret Shar-
ing scheme: the only information disclosed to the schedulers is the appliance125
category (must-run, deferrable, interruptible) and the feasible starting times.
Among the techniques proposed to securely collect meter readings, paper [19]
describes a wavelet-based data perturbation method to allow multiple entities to
access the data generated by a meter with different levels of detail, according to
their needs and access rights. Alternative techniques rely on data perturbation130
[20, 21, 22], pseudonymization [23, 24, 25], or on data aggregation by means of
MultiParty Computation [26, 27, 28]. Our proposed privacy-preserving schedul-
ing infrastructure is inspired by the one originally presented in [29] and adapted
to the Smart Grid context in [28], and is based on the same homomorphic en-
cryption scheme, named Shamir Secret Sharing. However, with respect to [28],135
which deals with the secure collection of meter readings in AMI, in this paper
we cope with an inherently different problem, characterized by peculiar privacy
requirements that must be addressed by means of specifically designed security
solutions.
3. Background140
3.1. Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme [30] belongs to the family of crypto-
graphic threshold schemes, which are designed to allow the collaborative recon-
struction of a secret. In a (w, t)-threshold scheme, the secret is divided in w
parts called shares, which are distributed among the protocol participants and145
can be reconstructed if at least t ≤ w participants cooperate.
The SSS scheme works as follows: let m ∈ Zq be the secret, where q is
a prime number, greater than w and than all the possible secrets. To split
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the secret in w shares, chose t − 1 integer random numbers ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρt−1
with uniform distribution in [0, q − 1] and calculate the s-th share of the se-150





s mod q. The secret can be recovered in pres-
ence of at least t shares by using the Lagrange interpolation method. The SSS
scheme is fully homomorphic, meaning that both addition and multiplication
can be performed directly on the shares, leading to the same result that would be155
obtained by computing the same operation on the plaintext. More in detail, the
sum of two secrets can be locally computed by each participant by summing the
corresponding shares. Conversely, multiplication requires a collaborative pro-
cedure, such as the one described in [31]. Therefore, any function that can be
expressed in terms of additions and multiplications can be computed by operat-160
ing on the shares, albeit with different complexity. In particular, several collab-
orative methods to perform the comparison of two secrets have been proposed
(see e.g. [32, 33]). In the remainder of the paper, we will adopt the procedure
first introduced in [34] and described in [33], which works as follows: each party




s) of the secrets m and m
′ to be compared165
selects two big random numbers rs, r
′
s, which can multiplicatively hide m−m′,
and a random bit bs ∈ {0, 1}. The collaborative protocol enables each party to
obtain a share of the quantity c = (m −m′)∏ts=1(−1)bsrs −∑ts=1(−1)1−bsr′s.
The result of the comparison can be computed by retrieving c, setting a bit e
either to 0 in case c > 0 or to 1 otherwise1, and calculating the result of the170
XOR operation ξ = e⊕ b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bt. ξ = 0 indicates that m > m′, while ξ = 1
indicates that m ≤ m′. The reader is referred to [33] for additional details about
the collaborative procedure and the proof of the correctness of the comparison
protocol.
1Note that in a modulo n field negative numbers are represented by the upper half of the
range [0, n− 1].
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3.2. Anonymous Routing with Crowds175
Crowds is an anonymous routing protocol originally proposed in [35] to hide
the true sender of a message by routing it randomly within a large group of users
(the crowd). The protocol assumes the presence of a central node called blender,
which is responsible of providing each node with the list of active crowd members
and of updating it periodically, and that the communications between any two
members of the crowd are encrypted using a symmetric key encryption scheme.
Upon receipt of a message, each crowd member P behaves as follows: with
probability p > 0.5, it forwards the message to a randomly chosen node within
the crowd (possibly itself), otherwise it sends the node to the final addressee
(see Algorithm 1). The most important anonymization property of Crowds is
that the entity to which the messages are sent is equally likely to receive the
message from any crowd member independently of the original sender, i.e.
P (G˜ = x|G = g) = P (G˜ = x) (1)
where G˜ is the random variable indicating the last hop of the message and G is
the random variable indicating the original source of the message. For a proof
of this statement and a detailed security analysis of the protocol, the reader is
referred to [35].
It is worth noting that our privacy-preservation protocol can be built upon180
other anonymous routing protocols, provided that they guarantee security prop-
erties similar to (1). We think Crowds is particularly well suited for the Neigh-
borhood Area Networks of Smart Grids, which may comprise only a limited
number of nodes, because its security properties do not depend on the size of
the network.185
4. The Privacy-Friendly Load Scheduling Framework
As depicted in Fig. 1, our proposed architecture comprises a set of Appli-
ances, A, each one generating its own load scheduling requests, and a set of
Schedulers, S, which collaboratively define the starting delay of the service re-
quests received from the Appliances. Note that, as in [9], we consider deferrable190
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Algorithm 1 Crowds routine executed by each crowd member P
if P is the sender of message M and M has never been forwarded then
Select a uniformly random node within the crowd and forward M to it
else
Receive the pair (Node P’, Message M)
Flip a biased coin such that (Pr(Heads) = p)
if Heads then
Select a uniformly random node within the crowd and forward M to it
else
Forward M to destination
end if
end if
Appliances without providing any guarantee on the maximum delay imposed by
the scheduling algorithm on their starting times. However, with respect to [9]
we also include must-run and interruptible Appliances in our analysis: service
requests generated by must-run devices must be served upon arrival without de-
lays nor interruptions, while interruptible appliances tolerate not only an initial195
service delay but also intermediate interruptions.
The architecture also includes a Smart Gateway in each household, which is
equipped with secure communication capabilities (e.g. as the one proposed by
the German Federal Office for Information Security in [36]) and is responsible of
gathering the service requests generated by the Appliances inside the building200
and to convey them to the Schedulers. In the following we will indicate as G
the set of Gateways. We also assume that:
1. The parties agree on a hybrid encryption algorithm E(Ke, ·) and a corre-
sponding decryption algorithm D(Kd, ·). The hybrid scheme is assumed to
be IND-CPA secure for equally sized messages [37] (i.e. it ensures message205
indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack) and uses state-of-the
























Figure 1: The privacy-friendly load scheduling infrastructure
2. Each Scheduler s ∈ S (1 ≤ s ≤ w) has its own pair of public/private keys
(Kse ,K
s
d) and all the Gateways know the public keys of the Schedulers.210
3. All the communication channels among the nodes of the architecture are
confidential and authenticated hop-by-hop.
4. A Configurator node acts as a blender for the Crowds routing protocol.
5. The scheduling horizon is divided in T˜ time slots.
The design goal is to make the Schedulers define the starting times of the load215
scheduling requests generated by the Appliances without learning their energy
consumption curve nor their owner. In order to hide the energy consumption
pattern of the devices, the Gateways generate multiple delayed versions of the
energy consumption curve of the local Appliances (possibly interleaved by inter-
ruptions), and encrypt each of them with the SSS scheme. The shares obtained220
from such data must be anonymously distributed among the Schedulers in a ran-
domized order: to do so, each set of shares (one for each sample of the curve)
is conveyed to the respective Scheduler by means of the anonymous routing
protocol Crowds.
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Figure 2: Data exchange during the load scheduling procedure. Message Ms is defined by
either Eq. (2), (3), or (4). Message Os is defined by either Eq. (5) or (7). message Fs is
defined by Eq. (6).
Once all the Schedulers have received their shares, they verify the feasibility225
of each delayed curve by checking whether the total power load of the Appliances
already scheduled does not exceed the expected amount of energy generated by
the RESes. We assume that such expected supply curve T (i) (i ≤ 1 ≤ T˜ )
is public and known to all the Schedulers. Such procedure is performed by
means of a collaborative protocol based on the one proposed in [33], which230
enables the Schedulers to make comparisons by operating directly on the shares.
Then, the Schedulers communicate to the local Gateway the feasibility of each
delayed curve. The protocol guarantees that the Schedulers know neither the
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shape or shift of each consumption curve, nor whether, for a given shift, the
corresponding shifted curve is feasible. The local Gateway schedules the lowest235
feasible starting time (and possible intermediate interruptions) and instructs the
Appliance accordingly. Finally, the shares of the shifted curve corresponding to
the delay scheduled by the Gateway are sent to the Schedulers, which use them
to update their information about the overall energy consumption within the
neighborhood by operating again directly on the shares.240
Figure 2 provides a pictorial view of the messages exchanged during execu-
tion of the protocol.
Let Da(i) be a sequence of samples of the load profile curve of the Appliance
a ∈ A (with 1 ≤ i ≤ D˜a, where D˜a is the sequence length). The sampling
rate is set to one sample per slot. If a initiates a new service request at slot τ245
(1 ≤ τ < T˜ − D˜a), it sends Da(i) to the local Gateway g. Let Γa be the chosen
starting time of a and Ba be the set of the chosen intermediate interruptions
while serving a. According to the appliance type ATa (must-run, deferrable, or
deferrable and interruptible), the Gateway g operates as follows:
• if a is a must-run Appliance, g computes a sequence V (i)a of length T˜ ,
where:
V (i)a =
 Da(i− τ) if τ < i ≤ τ + D˜a0 otherwise
which corresponds to setting the Appliance starting time Γa to the fol-
lowing time slot (i.e. Γa = τ + 1), without any intermediate interruption
(i.e. Ba = ). Each sample Va(i) is divided in w shares Sa,is = (xs, ya,is ),
where xs is the ID of Scheduler s. Note that the random coefficients
ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρt−1 used by the SSS scheme are refreshed for each sample.
Then, g generates an ephemeral encryption/decryption keypair (Kge ,K
g
d )
for the hybrid encryption scheme, a nonce ra, which is used as a tag as-






e ‖ATa‖ra‖Sa,1s ‖ . . . ‖Sa,T˜s ) (2)
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to the sth Scheduler2 by means of the anonymous routing protocol Crowds250
with forwarding probability p.
• if a is a deferrable Appliance, g computes T˜ − τ sequences V (i)ja (0 ≤ j ≤
T˜ − τ − 1) of length T˜ , where:
V (i)ja =
 Da(i− j − τ) if τ + j < i ≤ τ + j + D˜a0 otherwise
Such sequences correspond to different starting times, ranging from Γa =
τ+1 to Γa = T˜−D˜a, without any intermediate interruption (i.e. Ba = ).
Then, g divides every sample of each sequence in w shares using SSS
scheme, thus obtaining T˜ (T˜−τ) sets of w shares Sa,i,js , generates (Kge ,Kgd )





e ‖ATa‖ra‖Pj(Sa,1,js ‖ . . . ‖Sa,T˜ ,js )) (3)
where Pj indicates a random permutation of the sequences Sa,1,js ‖ . . . ‖Sa,T˜ ,js
over the possible values j of the shift.
• if a is a deferrable and interruptible Appliance, g computes (T˜ − τ)2 se-
quences V (i)j,za (0 ≤ j ≤ T˜ − τ − 1, 0 ≤ z ≤ T˜ − τ − 1) of length T˜ ,
where:
V (i)j,za =
 Da(i− j − τ) if τ + j < i ≤ τ + j + D˜a ∧ i− j − τ = z + 10 otherwise
Such sequences correspond to all the possible delays experienced by each
single sample of the energy consumption curve of a, within the scheduling
time span. Note that each sample is delayed regardless to the delays of
the preceding and successive samples, since excluding the vectors which
2For the sake of easiness, in this paper we set as SSS threshold t = w, meaning that all
the Schedulers must collaborate to perform the scheduling procedure. However, to improve
resiliency to faults and malfunctions, t could be lower than w. For a discussion on the correct
dimensioning of t and w to improve resiliency, the reader is referred to [28].
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do not respect the correct sample ordering would impact on the length
of Ms, which may leak information about the curve length D˜a. Then, g
generates T˜ (T˜ − τ)2 sets of w shares Sa,i,j,zs (w shares for each sample of
the (T˜ − τ)2 sequences of length T˜ ), (Kge ,Kgd ) and ra, and sends to the





e ‖ATa‖ra‖Pj,z(Sa,1,j,zs ‖ . . . ‖Sa,T˜ ,j,zs )) (4)
The expected daily energy production by RESes is expressed by the sequence
T (i) (1 ≤ i ≤ T˜ ), which is known to each Scheduler. Moreover, every Scheduler255
locally stores the shares of a sequence P (i) which records the overall power load
experienced by the grid, computed as the sum of the energy consumption curves
of all the appliances already scheduled. Such shares are initialized as Ps(i) = 0
for 1 ≤ i ≤ T˜ , 1 ≤ s ≤ w at the beginning of the scheduling horizon.
Upon reception of a new message Ms at slot τ , the s-th Scheduler operates260
as follows:
1 It decrypts Ms using its decryption key K
s
d and reads the application type
ATa.
2.a If a is a must-run Appliance, it assumes that the starting time of a is
scheduled for the slot τ+1, and updates Ps(i) = Ps(i)+y
a,i
s for 1 ≤ i ≤ T˜ ,265
regardless to the value of T (i). Note that, thanks to the homomorphic
properties of SSS with respect to addition, increasing the actual load curve
with the contribution of the new appliance can be done by operating
directly on the shares.
2.b If a is a deferrable (but non-interruptible) Appliance, for every sample
i of each sequence j, it computes P ′s(i) = Ps(i) + y
a,i,j
s , collaboratively
compares P ′(i) to T (i) with the other Schedulers according to the protocol
defined in [33], and stores the sth share Si,js (c) of the comparison output
ci,j and the associated random bit bi,js . Then, it generates the message:
Os = ra‖E(Kge , Sa,1s ‖ . . . ‖Pj(S1,js (c)‖b1,js ‖ . . . ‖ST˜ ,js (c)‖bT˜ ,js )) (5)
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and broadcasts it to every Gateway g ∈ G (note that broadcasting the
message is necessary, since the identity of the sender of the load request
is unknown to the Schedulers due to the usage of the Crowds protocol).
Upon reception of the w messages Os (one from each of the w Schedulers),
each Gateway compares the tags associated to the requests generated by
the local Appliances to ra. In case of matching, for every sample i of
each sequence j, it recovers ci,j by means of the w collected shares Si,js (c)
and computes the final comparison result ξi,j according to [33]. Then, for
each sequence j, g calculates Ξj = ξ1,j ∧ . . . ∧ ξT˜ ,j . Finally, g schedules
Γa = τ + 1 + j, where j = min{j : Ξj=1} j, communicates the pair Γa,Ba to
a, and anonymously sends to each Scheduler the shares of the jth sequence





s ‖ . . . ‖Sa,T˜ ,js ) (6)
In turn, each Scheduler s replaces Ps(i) with Ps(i) + y
a,i,j
s (1 ≤ i ≤ T˜ ). In270
case {j : Ξj = 1} = , an error message is returned and the local household
must decide whether to serve the Appliance with non RES energy or not
to run the Appliance at all. A discussion on the service policies to be
applied to ensure fairness in case of RES-energy shortage is left for future
investigation.275
2.c If a is a deferrable and interruptible Appliance, the same procedure de-
scribed in 2.b is performed for every sample i of each sequence identified
by the pair (j, z). Then, each Scheduler s broadcasts the message:
Os = ra‖E(Kge ,Pj,z(S1,j,zs (c)‖b1,j,zs ‖ . . . ‖ST˜ ,j,zs (c)‖bT˜ ,j,zs )) (7)
The Gateway locally connected to the Appliance a obtains the final com-
parison result ξi,j,z for each of the T˜ (T˜ − τ)2 samples, then for each se-
quence it calculates Ξj,z = ξ1,j,z ∧ . . .∧ ξT˜ ,j,z. Finally, it computes Γa and
Ba according to Algorithm 2, conveys them to a and anonymously for-
wards the algorithm output message Fs to the Schedulers, which update280
P (i) as described at step 2.b.
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Algorithm 2 Computation of starting time and intermediate interruptions of
deferrable and interruptible Appliances
Initialize Γa ← 0,B ← 
Initialize j(z)← 0 ∀z : 0 ≤ z ≤ D˜a − 1
Initialize ya,is ← 0 ∀s : 1 ≤ s ≤ w, i : 1 ≤ i ≤ T˜
for all z = 0 to D˜a − 1 do
J ← {j : Ξj,z = 1 ∧ j > j(z − 1)}




if j(z) > j(z − 1) + 1 then




for all s = 1 : w, i = 1 : T˜ do
ya,is ← ya,is + ya,i,j,zs
end for
end for
return Fs = (K
s
e , (xs, y
a,1
s ), · · · , (xs, ya,T˜s )) ∀s : 1 ≤ s ≤ w
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For the sake of easiness, we do not discuss the case of multiple requests
arriving in a short time interval: we assume that the Schedulers are able to
process multiple requests without ambiguities.
5. Attacker Model and Security Analysis285
5.1. Attacker Model
We assume a scenario where both Gateways and Schedulers behave accord-
ing to the honest-but-curious attacker model: they obey to the protocol rules
but try to infer the identities of the owners of active electrical appliances and
the type of appliance being used. The first objective can be achieved by asso-290
ciating the service requests to the identifier of the Gateway initiating them e.g.
through a linking attack, while the second implies the application of appliance
load monitoring techniques. Conversely, we assume that the time of use of the
appliances does not represent, by itself, a sensitive information, as long as it can-
not be linked to the owner nor to the type of the electrical appliance. However,295
it is worth noting that the probability of success of such kind of linking attacks,
which fall into the field of traffic analysis, decreases when the number of proto-
col participants increase, and can therefore be lowered by properly setting the
size of the set A. A possible countermeasure to linking attacks is to introduce
random scheduling delays for each appliance to be scheduled. Unfortunately,300
such approach would lead to a strong degradation of the protocol performance
in terms of the average delay experienced by the users, which would be intoler-
able in real scenarios. Moreover, the discussion of the impact of timing attacks
on both the Crowds routing and scheduling protocol is out of the scope of this
paper.305
Though in this paper we do not discuss the case of dishonest users, it is
worth noting that the protocol discourages selfish users from declaring their
appliances to be must-run, regardless to their real type, in order to eliminate
their experienced scheduling delay: since the protocol aims at adapting the
overall power load to the energy production by RESes, a large fraction of must-310
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run appliances would greatly reduce the flexibility of the aggregate load. In case
of economic incentives for the usage of renewables (e.g. lower energy price), a
schedule which does not take advantage of the availability of RESes would in
turn cause an increase in the energy price, thus affecting the energy bill of all
the users (including the cheaters).315
Moreover, a wide category of intrusive attacks aimed at Denial of Service
(DoS), can be mitigated by imposing a threshold on the maximum number of
daily scheduling requests (e.g. a few tens per day), which avoids the generation
of fake service requests by dishonest Gateways. Such fake requests would in-
evitably increase the delay experienced by the Appliances run by honest users.320
Conversely, the effect of malicious Gateways deviating from the standard Crowds
message forwarding routine (e.g. dropping messages instead of relaying them,
thus preventing the requests generated by honest users from being processed),
can be alleviated by lowering the SSS threshold t, which ensures the correct
execution of collaborative comparison procedure even in case of up to w − t325
missing shares.
Obliviousness. Similarly to [28], we define the architecture as oblivious if a col-
lusion of any number of Gateways cannot obtain information about the power
consumption pattern of the scheduled electrical appliances of the same type,
except for the ones belonging to the local household. More formally, we de-330
fine the Obliv experiment, which involves a challenger C and a probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary D controlling the whole set of Gateways:
1. At a given time slot τ D selects two Appliances a0, a1 ∈ A and communi-
cates to C the appliance types ATa0 , ATa1 , the tags ra0 , ra1 , the Gateway
encryption key Kge the consumption profiles Va0(i), Va1(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ T˜ ,335
and the random numbers ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρt−1 to be used to divide each sample
of Va0(i) and Va1(i) in shares.
2. C selects a random bit b = {0, 1}, generates Vb = {E(Kse ,Kge ‖ATab‖rab‖Sab,1s ‖
. . . ‖Sab,T˜s ) ∀s ∈ S} and communicates it to D.
3. D outputs a bit b′.340
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The architecture provides obliviousness if:
P (b′ = b | Vb) = P (b′ = b) = 1
2
Blindness. Moreover, we say that the architecture is t-blind if a collusion of less
than t Schedulers cannot learn anything about the energy consumption trend
of the appliances to be scheduled, except their type. To formalize this property,
we define the Blind experiment, involving a challenger C and an adversary D
controlling a set of Schedulers S˜ : |S˜| < t:345
1. At a given time slot τ , D selects two Appliances a0, a1 ∈ A and the energy
production profile by RESes T (i), and communicates Va0(i), Va1(i), T (i)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ T˜ to C, together with an arbitrarily chosen overall energy
consumption curve of the Appliances already scheduled.
2. C selects a random bit b = {0, 1} and generates Vb = {(S
ab,1
s , . . . , S
ab,T˜
s ) ∀s ∈350
S˜}. Moreover, C generates the shares Ps(i) ∀s ∈ S˜ of the overall energy
consumption curve provided by D, runs the comparison protocol described
in [33], stores a list I
ab
s of the messages received/sent by each Scheduler
s ∈ S˜ during the protocol execution, obtains the comparison outputs
Ob = {S
ab,1




s , . . . , b
ab,T˜
s ∀s ∈ S˜}, and communicates355
Vb, Ib = {I
ab
s ∀s ∈ S˜},Ob to D.
3. D outputs a bit b′.
The architecture provides t-blindness if:
P (b
′





Sender Anonymity. Finally, according to the definition in [38], the architecture
provides sender anonymity if a collusion of any number of Schedulers cannot
associate a request to the identity of the user whose Appliance generated it.360
Adopting the same formalization of [35], we define the following experiment,
named S-Anon, which assumes a challenger C and an adversary D controlling
the whole set of Schedulers S:
1. D selects an Appliance a ∈ A and communicates Va(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ T˜ to C.
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2. C generates the set of encrypted measurements V = {E(Kse ,Kge ‖ATa‖ra‖Sa,1s ‖365
. . . ‖Sa,T˜s ) ∀s ∈ S} and forwards each of them to the addressed Scheduler
s by means of the Crowds routine until they reach the addressee.
3. D outputs the guess g′ of the identifier g of the Gateway locally connected
to a.
The architecture provides sender anonymity if:
P (g = g′) ≤ 1|G|
5.2. Security Analysis370
We now discuss how the security properties defined in Section 5.1 are satisfied
by our proposed infrastructure, also providing formal proofs.
Theorem 1. Under the assumption that the cryptosystem E(Ke, ·) ensures mes-
sage indistinguishability, the privacy-preserving load scheduling infrastructure
provides obliviousness for Appliances of the same type.375
Proof. By contradiction, let us assume that the adversary D has more than
negligible advantage in the Obliv experiment. Since in Obliv the adversary
A arbitrarily chooses all the parameters to construct the plaintext messages
Kge ‖ATab‖rab‖Sab,1s ‖ . . . ‖Sab,V˜s ∀s ∈ S and the messages are equally sized if the
two Appliances are of the same type, the Obliv is constructed analogously to380
the IND-CPA experiment [37]. It follows that, if D has more than negligible
advantage over randomness to guess b in the Obliv experiment, it also has a non-
negligible advantage in the IND-CPA experiment, which violates the assumption
of message indistinguishability under chosen plaintext. Therefore, even if a
collusion of Gateways collects all the w encrypted measurements of a given385
service request, it cannot obtain any information on the encrypted data.
Theorem 2. Assuming the usage of a (w, t)-SSS scheme (t ≤ w), the privacy-
preserving load scheduling infrastructure provides t-blindness for Appliances of
the same type.
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Proof. The proof is a consequence of the property of perfect secrecy of the
SSS scheme [39] and shows that the contents of all the input/output messages
received/sent by the collusion S˜ during the scheduling procedure leak no infor-
mation about b. For the single SSS-encrypted ith sample, the proof is similar to
the one provided in [40, Theorem 3]: let A0, A1 be the random variables indi-
cating the ith sample of Appliances a0, a1. Since the value of A0 is completely
determined by knowledge of A1, it follows that:
P (b = 0 | Sab,is , Iab,is , Sab,is (c), bb,is , ∀s ∈ S˜) =
= P (A0 = Va0(i), A1 = Va1(i) | Sab,is , Iab,is , Sab,is (c), bb,is ∀s ∈ S˜) =
= P (A0 = Va0(i) | Sab,is , Iab,is , Sab,is (c), bb,is ∀s ∈ S˜)
Since the random polynomials used to calculate each share belonging to Vb, Ib,Ob
are independently generated, the knowledge of S
ab,i
s gives no information about
A1−b. Further, we note that b
b,i
s are random bits independently chosen w.r.t.
the secrets, and that the messages listed in I
ab,i
s are either shares of functions




s (see Section 3.1), or of intermediate results
for the collaborative computation of S
ab,i
s (c), in which each share is in turn di-
vided in w shares according to the procedure described in [31]. Therefore, by
exploiting the perfect secrecy property of SSS (which states that the knowledge
of less than t shares does not leak any information about the secret), we can
write:
P (A0 = Va0(i) | Sab,is , Sab,is (c), Iab,is , bb,is ∀s ∈ S˜) = P (A0 = Va0(i)) = P (b = 0) =
1
2
The extension to a set of T˜ measurements is straightforward. Note that for390
Appliances of the same type, the overall number of samples in a message is the
same, thus the message length does not provide any additional information.
Since in this paper we assume t = w, information leakages can occur only in
case all the w Schedulers are compromised and the infrastructure is w-blind.
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Theorem 3. Under assumption that the Crowds message forwarding routine395
follows Algorithm 1, the privacy-friendly load scheduling architecture provides
sender anonymity.
Proof. Let G˜ be the random variable indicating the set of Gateways from which
the set of Schedulers S receive the w encrypted shares. Since each share is
routed independently, then
P (G˜ = (x1, x2, . . . , xw)|G = g) = P (G˜ = x|G = g)w.
Using (1) we have,
P (G˜ = x|G = g)w = P (G˜ = x)w = P (G˜ = (x1, x2, . . . , xw))
Therefore, D obtains no additional information about the identifier of the
local Gateway g, from which it follows that the S-Anon experiment has no
advantage with respect to randomness.400
6. Benchmark Integer Linear Program
In order to evaluate the performance of our privacy-preserving scheduling
approach, we propose as benchmark the following ILP model. It assumes to re-
ceive as input the time of arrival of each service request and the corresponding
appliance load profile, within the time span considered for the allocation of the405
energy requests. Conversely, our scheduling infrastructure performs the alloca-
tion in real-time without having access to the individual energy consumption
profile of the electrical appliances.
Sets
• A: set of deferrable and interruptible Appliances410
• I = 1, · · · , T˜ : set of discretized time slots within the optimization time
span
• T = {1, . . . ,maxa D˜a}: set of discretized time slots within the runtime of
the Appliances (maxa∈A D˜a < T˜ )
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Parameters415
• ei: amount of RES-supplied energy at time i ∈ I
• mi: aggregated energy consumption profile of must-run Appliances
• ta: time of arrival of the service request generated by Appliance a ∈ A
• D˜a: runtime of Appliance a ∈ A
• kai: it is 1 if i ≥ ta, 0 otherwise420
• cat: load profile of Appliance a ∈ A at time t ∈ T
Variables
• zait: binary variable, it is 1 if the t-th sample of appliance a ∈ A is
















 ei −mi if ei > mi0 otherwise ∀i ∈ I (9)
zait ≤ kai ∀a ∈ A, i ∈ I, t ∈ T : t ≤ D˜a (10)
∑
i∈I
zait = 1 ∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T : t ≤ D˜a (11)
∑
j∈I : j<i
zaj(t−1) ≥ zait ∀a ∈ A, i ∈ I, t ∈ T : t ≤ D˜a (12)
The objective function (8) minimizes the sum of the delays experienced by the
Appliances. Constraint (9) imposes that, in case the amount of energy required
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by the must-run Appliances does not exceed the energy provided by RESes, the
overall energy consumption due to both must-run and deferrable/interruptible430
Appliances does not go over the RES-provided energy level. Conversely, if the
amount of energy required by must-run Appliances exceeds the energy produc-
tion by RESes, no deferrable/interruptible Appliance is scheduled. Constraint
(10) ensures that the Appliances’ starting times are scheduled after the arrivals
of the corresponding service requests, while Constraint (11) imposes that every435
(non-null) sample of each Appliance is scheduled exactly once. Finally, Con-
straint 12 ensures that the samples of each Appliance are scheduled sequentially
(possibly interleaved by interruptions).
In order to adapt the above discussed model to deferrable non-interruptible
Appliances, the following constraint has to be included in the formulation to





izai1 + 1 = D˜a ∀a ∈ A (13)
7. Performance Evaluation
In this Section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed scheduling440
mechanism in terms of computational complexity, message number and length.
Moreover, we compare the achieved average service delay to the optimal re-
sults obtained by means of the ILP formulation presented in Section 6. In our
implementation, the hybrid cryptosystem used for the share encryption is the
RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm [41], which uses the RSA public key cryp-445
tosystem modulo n, the KDF2 key derivation function (based on SHA-1) and
the AES-Wrap-k key-wrapping scheme (where k is the AES key size) to commu-
nicate an ephemeral k-bit-long key used to encrypt the samples V (i) by means
of the standard AES scheme operating in Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC).
7.1. Computational Complexity450
We start discussing the asymptotic number of incoming/outgoing messages
for each node and scheduling phase. As shown in Table 2, the number of mes-
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sages exchanged by the Gateways exhibits a linear dependence on w, while for
the Schedulers it depends linearly on T˜ and superlinearly on w (the logarith-
mic factor is due to the collaborative comparison procedure discussed in [33]).455
However, since the total number of shares w is expected to be limited, the time
horizon T˜ is the only tunable parameters significantly influencing the number
of messages.
Table 3 reports the type and number of operations performed by each node
for the scheduling of a single service request. The computational cost of each460
operation is detailed in Table 4 based on [31, 33]. Assuming a few Schedulers
(e.g. less than 5) and the usage of optimized hardware for fast modular multipli-
cation3, at the Gateways the most demanding operation is the RSA-AES hybrid
encryption, with timings in the order of milliseconds for must-run appliances,
of hundreds of milliseconds for deferrable non-interruptible appliances, and of465
tens of seconds for deferrable interruptible appliances (results obtained based
on the data provided in [42, 43]). At the Schedulers, the computational time of
the share collaborative comparison performed in multiple rounds depending on
w is comparable to the running time of the hybrid encryption/decryption.
Note that Table 3 does not report the operations performed by the Crowds470
forwarding routine: for a detailed a discussion on the impact of |G| and p on the
message latency, expected path length and number of appearances of a given
Gateway on all paths, the reader is referred to [35].
Finally, it is worth discussing the message length. Let L[x] indicate the
length of message x in bits, and let Pad[x] indicate the length in bits of the475
message of size x after PKCS1.5 cryptographic padding and concatenation to a
128-bit-long initialization vector, as required by the AES specifications. Each
service request generated/forwarded by the Gateways and received by a Sched-
uler is an RSA-KEM encrypted message Ms of L[n]+k+64+Pad[k+L[ATa]+
L[ra]+ T˜L[q]] bits in case of must-run Appliance (where k+64 bits is the output480
3We estimated timings of tens of nanoseconds per single 64-bit modular Montgomery mul-
tiplication on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5 processor
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Table 1: Message length for a service request generated at time slot τ = 1.
Appliance Type Ms Os Fs
Must-run 19.90 kbit 18.85 kbit 19.78 kbit
Deferr. 5.31 Mbit 5.39 Mbit 19.78 kbit
Deferr. Interr. 1.53 Gbit 1.55 Gbit 19.78 kbit
length of the AES-Wrap-k key-wrapping scheme), of L[n] + k + 64 + Pad[k +
L[ATa]+L[ra]+(T˜ −τ)T˜L[q]] bits in case of deferrable non-interruptible Appli-
ance, and of L[n]+k+64+Pad[k+L[ATa]+L[ra]+ (T˜ − τ)2T˜L[q]] bits in case
of deferrable and interruptible Appliance. During the share comparison proce-
dure, each share received by a Scheduler is in turn divided in w shares, which485
are redistributed among the Schedulers. In case of deferrable non-interruptible
(resp. deferrable and interruptible) Appliances, to perform T˜ (T˜ − τ) (resp.
T˜ (T˜ − τ)2) comparisons per round each Scheduler sends/receives w − 1 mes-
sages per round of T˜ (T˜ − τ)L[q] (resp. T˜ (T˜ − τ)2L[q]) bits each (see [33] for
further details). The comparison output Os broadcasted by each Scheduler490
to every Gateway consists of w messages of L[ra] + Pad[(T˜ − τ)T˜ (L[q] + 1)]
(resp.L[ra] + Pad[(T˜ − τ)2T˜ (L[q] + 1)). Finally, the Gateway sends to each
Scheduler the selected consumption curve through the message Fs of length
L[n] + k + 64 + Pad[T˜L[q]].
Possible choices of the system parameters are: 1024-bit-long modulo n for495
the RSA cryptosystem, key length k =128 bits for the AES cryptosystem and 64-
bit-long modulo q for the SSS scheme. The appliance tag ATa and the random
number ra can be assumed to have length of 2 bits and 32 bits respectively.
The assumed scheduling horizon can be a 24 hours period, divided in time
slot duration is 5 minutes, which corresponds to T˜ =288 samples. The message500
lengths obtained with these parameters are summarized in Table 1 for the worst
case of τ = 1. Since in case of deferrable and interruptible Appliances the
message size of Ms and Os is in the order of Gb, a trade-off between the duration
of the scheduling horizon and of the single time slots must be found (e.g. 12
hours with slots of 15 minutes would result in lengths of tens of Mb).505
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Send request O( wp|G|(1−p) ) O(
wp
|G|(1−p) )
Comparison computation (deferr./interr) O(w) -




Send request O(1) -
Comparison computation (deferr.) O(w2dlog2(w)eT˜ (T˜ − τ)) O(w2dlog2(w)eT˜ (T˜ − τ))
Comparison computation (interr.) O(w2dlog2(w)eT˜ (T˜ − τ)2) O(w2dlog2(w)eT˜ (T˜ − τ)2)
Update consumption curve (deferr./interr) O(1) -
Table 3: Computational load at each node for the scheduling of a single service request
Gateway
must-run: T˜Cs(q) + wCe(n, Pad[L[q]T˜ ])
def.: T˜ (T˜ − τ)(Cs(q) +Cl(q)) +wCe(n, Pad[k+L[ATa] +L[ra] +L[q]T˜ (T˜ −
τ)]) + wCd(n, Pad[(L[q] + 1)T˜ (T˜ − τ)]) + Cy(L[T˜ ]) + wCe(n, Pad[L[q]T˜ ])
def. int.: T˜ (T˜ − τ)2(Cs(q) + Cl(q)) + wCe(n, Pad[k + L[ATa] + L[ra] +
L[q]T˜ (T˜ − τ)2]) + Cd(n, Pad[(L[q] + 1)T˜ (T˜ − τ)2]) + (T˜ − τ)Cy(L[T˜ ]) +
wCe(n, Pad[L[q]T˜ (T˜ − τ)])
Scheduler
must-run: Cd(n, Pad[k + L[ATa] + L[ra] + L[q]T˜ ]) + T˜Ca(q)
def.: Cd(n, Pad[k + L[ATa] + L[ra] + L[q]T˜ (T˜ − τ)]) + T˜ (T˜ − τ)(Ca(q) +
Cc(q)) + T˜Ca(q) + Ce(n, Pad[(L[q] + 1)T˜ (T˜ − τ)]) + Cd(n, Pad[L[q]T˜ ])
def. int.: Cd(n, Pad[k + L[ATa] + L[ra] + L[q]T˜ (T˜ − τ)2]) + T˜ (T˜ −
τ)2(Ca(q) + Cc(q)) + T˜ (T˜ − τ)Ca(q) + Ce(n, Pad[(L[q] + 1)T˜ (T˜ −
τ)2])+Cd(n, Pad[L[q]T˜ (T˜ − τ)])
see Table 4 for the cost details.
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Table 4: Detail of operation costs
Notation Description Computational Cost
Cs(x)
cost of the generation of w shares
modulo x
w(w − 1) additions modulo x +
w(w − 1) multiplications modulo x +
(w − 1) random number generations mod-
ulo x
Ca(x) cost of a share addition modulo x 1 addition modulo x
Cl(x) cost of a share Lagrange interpola-
tion modulo x
O(w2) multiplications modulo x
Cm(x) cost of a share collaborative multi-
plication modulo x
2 multiplications modulo x +Cs(x) +
Ca(x), performed in 2 rounds
Cy(x) cost of finding the lowest feasible
scheduling delay
T˜ (T˜ − τ) XOR operations over x bits +
T˜ (T˜−τ) AND operations over 1 bit + (T˜−
τ) comparisons over x bits
Cc(x)
cost of a collaborative comparison
modulo x
2 random number generation modulo x +
1 random number generation modulo 2 +
2 exponentiations modulo x + 2 multipli-
cations modulo x +
2Cs(x) + (w+ 1)Ca(x) +O(w)Cm(x), per-
formed in dlog2 we rounds
Ce(x, l)
cost of an RSA-KEM encryption
with RSA modulo x and AES
encryption of a message of l bits
1 random number generation modulo x +
1 exponentiation modulo x




cost of an RSA-KEM decryption
with RSA modulo x and AES
decryption of a message of l bits
1 exponentiation modulo x +





To compare the service delay introduced by our first-fit scheduling approach
to the minimum delay obtainable through an optimization procedure, we ex-
tracted several load profiles of dishwashers (peak consumption of 1500 W),
washing machines (peak consumption of 750 W), and dryers (peak consumption510
6000 W) from the SMART* dataset [44] and resampled them with a rate of one
sample every 5 minutes. As renewable energy supplying profile, we considered
a windfarm with peak production of 50 MW: the normalized hourly production
(available at [45]) has been linearly interpolated to obtain a 5 minutes sam-
pling period. We considered a scenario with 20 households equipped with one515
dishwasher, one washing machine and one dryer each, for a total amount of 60
appliances. Each of them generates a service request with uniform distribu-
tion within a period of 24 hours, and 365 instances, corresponding to 1 year of
wind energy production data. Each household is also equipped with a set of
must-run appliances including lights, oven, fridge, and heater (see [44] for the520
comprehensive list), with a peak overall consumption of 5000 W.
For each instance, both the scheduling approach proposed in Section 4 and
the ILP formulation described in Section 6 have been applied, first under the
assumption that the 60 appliances are deferrable non-interruptible, then as-
suming them as deferrable and interruptible. Since the time horizon of each525
instance is one day, in case the scheduling delay of an Appliance exceeds 24
hours, the scheduling is considered to be infeasible. Table 5 reports the re-
spective probabilities of finding a feasible solution to the scheduling problem.
For non-interruptible Appliances, in approximately 15.1% of the considered in-
stances, both approaches do not provide a feasible result: this happens when the530
overall daily energy production is not sufficient to satisfy all the service requests.
Therefore, in those cases, the Appliances must be served using non-renewable
energy sources, which are assumed to be unlimited and thus do not introduce
any scheduling delay4. Such percentage reduces to 13.2% in case of interruptible
4We do not investigate a mixed RES/non-RES approach, which would introduce unfairness
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appliances. In a borderline scenario, where the amount of wind energy is only535
slightly greater than the total energy demand, it may happen that our proposed
scheduling approach fails in providing a feasible schedule, while the ILP formu-
lation succeeds. However, we incurred in such condition only for the 0.8% of the
considered instances in case of non-interruptible Appliances and for 1.9% in case
of interruptible Appliances. Finally, in around 84% of cases, both approaches540
provide feasible solutions to the scheduling problem either for interruptible and
non-interruptible Appliances: the average delay between service request and
starting time experienced by a single appliance is in the range of 37-42 minutes,
with an average increase of 1.8% of the suboptimal scheduling (maximum gap
of 32.7% for interruptible Appliances and of 40.1% for non-interruptible Ap-545
pliances) of our proposed infrastructure with respect to the optimal solutions
obtained through the ILP model. With both approaches, in case of interruptible
Appliances the scheduling delay is slightly reduced (2 mins per Appliance on
average) with respect to the non-interruptible case. Therefore, our scheduling
mechanisms protects users’ privacy without significantly affecting the service550
delays experienced by the Appliances.
8. Conclusions
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving framework for the scheduling of
power consumption requests generated by electrical Appliances in a Smart Grid
scenario. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to address the555
problem of securely handling user data to provide a load scheduling service. The
energy consumption requests generated by the smart Appliances located in the
users’ households within a neighborhood are anonymously conveyed to a set of
Schedulers by means of a Crowds-based routing protocol. The Schedulers col-
laboratively define the schedule of the requests using a Multiparty Computation560
in the service policy, since the fraction of Appliances powered with RES energy would possibly
experience a scheduling delay, while the ones powered with traditional energy sources would
be served immediately.
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Table 5: Comparison of feasibility and average scheduling delay
Feasibility occurrence [%] Average Delay [min] Gap [%]
Non-interruptible Appliances
Secure Optimal Secure Optimal
3 3 84.1 41.7 39.8 1.9
7 3 0.8 - 147.4 -
7 7 15.1 - - -
Interruptible Appliances
3 3 84.9 39.8 37.8 1.7
7 3 1.9 - 259.1 -
7 7 13.2 - - -
mechanism based on Shamir Secret Sharing scheme. We evaluate the security
guarantees provided by our proposed infrastructure assuming an honest-but-
curious attacker model and show through numerical results that the additional
delay is modest with respect to the optimal solutions obtained by means of an
Integer Linear Programming formulation.565
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